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A NEW HORIZON: LEGAL
REFORMS, NEW REGULATORY
MODELS, PREDICTIONS
The Importance of Deceptive
Practice Enforcement in Financial
Institution Regulation
Prentiss Cox*
No more bytes need be consumed nor ink spilled to observe
that the rampant abuse and negligence in residential mortgage
lending over the last ten years was a disaster for America and
beyond. Because this concept has attained near universal
recognition, there has been a struggle to define exactly what
happened and who was responsible. How we collectively write
this story affects how government will respond to the long-term
problems in the market exposed by the mortgage collapse.
Subprime mortgage lending was a disaster for hundreds of
thousands of American homeowners long before it was at the
center of the popular understanding of the financial crisis. The
history of harm to American homeowners, and the utter failure
of the American regulatory system to grasp and rectify these
problems until it was too late to contain the damage to the
financial system, offers valuable lessons for how we should
structure the reform of our financial institutions.
The thesis of this Article is that enforcement of consumer
protection laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and
practices should be part of the core mission of the re-structured
financial regulatory system. Soaring defaults in mortgage
loans and accompanying devastation to the credit markets
could have been averted if the persistent concerns raised by
consumer advocates working with subprime borrowers in the
late 1990s and early 2000s had been given serious and prompt
279
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attention.1 Not only the consumer financial services industry,
* Prentiss Cox is an Associate Professor of Clinical Law at the
University of Minnesota Law School. Until July 2005, he was an Assistant
Attorney General and Manager of the Consumer Enforcement Division in the
0LQQHVRWD $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO·V 2IILFH 7KLV $UWLFOH ZDV SRVVLEOH RQO\ EHFDXVH
of the research assistance provided by Kari Rudd. The author thanks Claire
Hill and Brett McDonnell for their generous and helpful advice.
1. See, e.g., Promoting Home Ownership by Ensuring Liquidity in the
Subprime Mortgage Market: Joint Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and the H. Subcomm. on
Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs.,
108th Cong. 19 (2004) (statement of Michael D. Calhoun, General Counsel,
Center for Responsible Lending) [hereinafter Calhoun 2004 testimony]
VWDWLQJ WKDW ´>W@KH FRQWLQXDWLRQ RI XQFKHFNHG SUHGDWRU\ ORDQ SUDFWLFHV
JUDYHO\ WKUHDWHQV KRPHRZQHUVKLS DQG HTXLW\ RI IDPLOLHVµ HQFRXUDJLQJ WKH
FRPPLWWHH ´WR HQDFW HIIHFWLYH IHGHUDO SURWHFWLRQV OLNH WKRVH LQ 1RUWK &DUROLQDµ
LQFOXGLQJ DVVLJQHH OLDELOLW\ DQG QRWLQJ WKDW ´IHGHUDO SURWHFWLRQV VKRXOG EH D
IORRU QRW D FHLOLQJµ  Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and its
Customers: Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit and the H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the
H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 108th Cong. 68 (2004) (statement of Eric
Stein, Senior Vice President, Center for Responsible Lending of North
Carolina) [hereinafter Stein 2004 testimony] (discussing the impact of North
&DUROLQD·V DQWL-SUHGDWRU\ OHQGLQJ ODZ QRWLQJ WKDW ´OLPLWLQJ XSIURQW IHHV   
has eliminated a lot of the equity stripping abuses . . . [and] borrowers[ ] who
qualify for conventional loans[ ] are actually getting conventional loaQVµ 
Predatory Lending Practices: Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Financial
Servs., 106th Cong. 107 (2000) (statement of Margot Saunders, Managing
Attorney, National Consumer Law Center) [hereinafter Saunders 2000
testimony] (discussing the limitations of the Home Ownership Equity
3URWHFWLRQ $FW ZKLFK ´RQO\ FRYHUV  SHUFHQW RI WKH VXESULPH ORDQV    >DQG@
GRHVQ·W DGHTXDWHO\ DGGUHVV >SUHGDWRU\ OHQGLQJ@ E\ SURKLELWLQJ UHDO SUREOHP
WHUPVµ  Id. (written statement of John E. Taylor, President and CEO,
National Community Reinvestment Coalition) [hereinafter Taylor 2000
ZULWWHQ WHVWLPRQ\@ GLVFXVVLQJ 1&5& DQG WKH 5DLQERZ386+ &RDOLWLRQ·V
LQLWLDWLYH WR ´FRPEDW :DOO 6WUHHW ILQDQFLQJ RI SUHGDWRU\ OHQGLQJµ DQG
encouraging the Federal Reserve Board to use its authority to regulate
mortgage lenders that are the subsidiaries of bank holding companies as well
DV ´PDQ\ FRPSDQLHV WKDW XQGHUZULWH SXUFKDVH DQG VHUYLFH PRUWJDJH-backed
securities based on subprime loans by non-EDQN OHQGHUVµ  Reform of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and Truth in Lending Act (TILA):
Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and
the H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm.
on Banking and Financial Servs., 105th Cong. 138 (1998) (statement of
Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law Center)
>KHUHLQDIWHU 6DXQGHUV  WHVWLPRQ\@ ´>$@EXVLYH ORDQ SURWHFWLRQV DUH YHU\
very necessary, and it would be inappropriate to proceed with amending the
only two Federal laws that essentially govern mortgages in this country
without dealing with the abusive loans that we see every day in every State
LQ WKH FRXQWU\µ  Id. (written statement of Margot Saunders, Managing
Attorney, National Consumer Law Center) [hereinafter Saunders 1998
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but also many regulators, legislators and academics viewed
consumer protection as either irrelevant to core regulatory
objectives or antithetical to market efficiency and growth.2
They were wrong. Government agencies and public interest
entities primarily focused on consumer protection were
sounding the alarm about the practices that caused the
mortgage collapse for almost a decade before financial system
regulators began to take the problem seriously.3 Consumer
protection concerns should be at the core of the regulatory
system mission, partly to ensure that lending institutions are
financially sound in the long-term.
Part I of this Article examines the federal and state
regulatory system for mortgage lending and identifies
regulators responsible for enforcing consumer protection laws
applicable to mortgage origination. Part II reviews how those
regulators performed in the years leading up to the mortgage
crisis, including the state consumer protection actions that
highlighted, at an early stage, the fundamental problems with
mortgage lending. Part III suggests some ideas for how to build
a consumer protection focus within the financial institution
written testimony] (discussing the failure of the marketplace to protect
consumers, making recommendations for improving disclosure requirements,
proposing substantive protections for borrowers, and opposing moratoria on
class action lawsuits regarding illegal lender-paid mortgage broker fees).
2. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 86-  GHVFULELQJ EDQNLQJ DJHQFLHV· GLVLQWHUest in
exercising their powers to develop consumer protection regulations and the
2IILFH RI WKH &RPSWUROOHU RI WKH &XUUHQF\·V HIIRUWV WR DVVHUW IHGHUDO
preemption of state consumer protection laws). See generally Richard A.
Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 803 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Saunders 2000 testimony, supra note 1; Taylor 2000 written
testimony, supra note 1; Saunders 1998 testimony, supra note 1; Saunders
1998 written testimony, supra note 1. See also Robert Berner & Brian Grow,
They Warned Us, BUS. WK., Oct. 20, 2008 (discussing the efforts of Iowa,
North Carolina, Georgia, Michigan, and the City of Cleveland to regulate
predatory lending during the early 2000s and federal preemption of state
regulatory authority); Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Federal Trade
Commission, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Federal
Reserve
System
(Mar.
9
2001),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v010004.shtm (commenting on proposed amendments
to Regulation Z implementing the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
$FW ´+2(3$µ  UHFRPPHQGLQJ H[SDQVLRQ RI +2(3$ DQG QRWLQJ ´WKH OLQN
between subprime lending and foreclosure rates, the latter of which have
increased more thaQ WKH PDUNHW VKDUH RI VXESULPH ORDQVµ 
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regulatory structure.
I.

Consumer Protection and Mortgage Lending Regulation

Two related questions often raised in discussing the
mortgage meltdown are: (1) why did so many American
homeowners obtain mortgage loans that ended in default, or
perhaps even were destined to fail; and (2) why did creditors
and investors who ultimately provided the capital for these
loans fail to properly assess their risk? The first question
raises issues of loan origination. In terms of regulation, it begs
a follow-up inquiry about how residential mortgage lenders
were able to sell such loans in the first place. The second
question implicates a somewhat distinct set of actors, especially
in the secondary financing markets.4 This Article focuses on
the first question³issues of loan origination and the consumer
protection laws applicable to those transactions. The Article
discusses whether a stronger focus on consumer protection
enforcement actions in public regulation of the residential
mortgage market may have prevented the mass origination of
subprime mortgage loans that defaulted at historic levels.5
While there clearly is a relationship between the secondary
market actors and consumer protection concerns in loan
origination,6 consumer protection laws naturally focus on loan
4. See, e.g., Chris L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2255-63 (2007) (describing inadequacy of current
consumer protection laws in providing recourse against lending abuses with
securitized financing).
5. 7KLV $UWLFOH IRFXVHV RQ ´VXESULPH OHQGLQJµ DOWKRXJK LQ WKH SHULRG
from 2004 through 2006 many of the same issues arose in the origination of
´$OW-$µ ORDQV ZKLFK FRQVLVWV RI ORDQV RI OHVV WKDQ SULPH TXDOLW\ RU WKDW
contain higher risk features, such as negative amortization. U.S. GOV·T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING
AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL
REGULATORY
SYSTEM
24
(2009),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
6. This relationship between consumer protection in origination and
secondary market financing has been analyzed with commendable brilliance
by Professors Chris Peterson, Pat McCoy, and Kathleen Engel. These
commentators advocated imposing assignee liability for problems in
origination on secondary market actors to make them account for consumer
protection concerns when funding mortgage loans. See Kathleen C. Engel &
Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/21

4

2009]

DECEPTIVE PRACTICE ENFORCEMENT

283

origination³the part of the lending process in which the
homeowner is involved directly. Consumer protection laws
applicable to mortgage financing apply almost entirely to loan
origination.7
A. Consumer Protection and Mortgage Lending
Consumer protection laws governing mortgage loan
origination can be grouped into three categories: (1) disclosure
requirements; (2) substantive regulation of loan terms; and (3)
a broad prohibition on unfair and deceptive acts. Restrictions
on mortgage lending in each of these areas exist at both the
federal and state level. These laws also are a mix of generally
applicable laws and those that govern only mortgage lending.
1. Disclosure Requirements
The primary federal laws governing consumer finance
lending mostly rely on mandated disclosure of information to
the consumer about the transaction.8 The Truth in Lending
$FW ´7,/$µ KDV GHWDLOHG GLVFORVXUH UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU ´FORVHG
HQGµ FUHGLW WUDQVDFWLRQV ZKLFK ZRXOG LQFOXGH WKH YDst majority
of first-lien mortgage loans.9 The lender must provide a
standardized disclosure form that reveals the cost of credit in
WKH IRUP RI DQ ´DQQXDO SHUFHQWDJH UDWHµ10 Four other amounts,
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007); Peterson, supra note 4. See also
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1337-57 (2002)
(calling for a suitability standard for subprime loans).
7. 7KH 7UXWK LQ /HQGLQJ $FW ´7,/$µ LPSRVHV REOLJDWLRQV RQ D FUHGLWRU
at the time a loan is originated through disclosure requirements. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1602(f), 1637a, 1638 (2006). HOEPA prohibits certain terms for high-cost
loans. Id.   7KH 5HDO (VWDWH 6HWWOHPHQW 3URFHGXUHV $FW ´5(63$µ
also regulates loans at the origination stage through disclosure requirements
and a prohibition on unearned fees and kickbacks. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2603, 2604,
2607. RESPA additionally regulates loan servicing and escrow account
administration. Id. § 2605.
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the
Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in
Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 187 (2008) ´Today, the consumer credit
PDUNHWSODFH LV JRYHUQHG DOPRVW H[FOXVLYHO\ E\ GLVFORVXUH UXOHVµ .
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1638.
10. Id. § 1638(a)(4); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17, 226.18(e) (2009).
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VXFK DV ´WKH WRWDO RI SD\PHQWVµ PXVW EH SURPLQHQWO\
disclosed.11 Numerous other items, such as whether the loan
contains a prepayment penalty, can be disclosed less
prominently on the same form.12
Also encompassed within TILA is a separate set of
disclosures for high cost mortgage refinancing loans enacted
with thH +RPH 2ZQHUVKLS (TXLW\ 3URWHFWLRQ $FW ´+2(3$µ 13
HOEPA applies only to mortgage loans that exceed certain cost
RU DQQXDO SHUFHQWDJH UDWH ´WULJJHUµ DPRXQWV14 Until recent
amendments, these amounts were set by regulation at a very
high level that excluded even the usual subprime mortgage
loan.15 HOEPA requires a special notice that warns the
KRPHRZQHU WKDW ´[y]ou could lose your home, and any money
you have put into it, if you do not meet your obligations under
WKH ORDQµ16 These disclosures must be given to the homeowner
three business days prior to the closing on the refinance loan.17
Mortgage loan disclosures also are required by federal law
XQGHU WKH 5HDO (VWDWH 6HWWOHPHQW 3URFHGXUHV $FW ´5(63$µ 18
$ ´JRRG IDLWK GLVFORVXUHµ OLVWLQJ WKH FRVWV WKDW ZLOO be incurred
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.18.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a).
13. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2191-94 (1994) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1639). See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.31, 226.32.
14. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a).
15. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,527 (July 30, 2008) (to
EH FRGLILHG DW  &)5 SW  ´&RQVXPHU DGYRFDWHV DQG VRPH VWDWH
officials stated that HOEPA is generally effective in preventing abusive
terms in loans subject to the HOEPA price triggers. They noted, however,
that very few loans are made with rates or fees at or above the HOEPA
WULJJHUV    µ  Id. at 44,536 ([T]he Board has concluded that [a threshold of
1.5 percentage points above the average prime offer rate for first lien loans
and 3.5 percentage points for second lien loans] should cover the subprime
PDUNHW DQG JHQHUDOO\ H[FOXGH WKH SULPH PDUNHW    µ  See also Stephen
Labaton, Lenders Fight Stricter Rules on Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2008, at A1 (noting that the HOEPA trigger of 8% above the prevailing rates
on Treasury securities only applied to 1% of all mortgages).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(1)(B).
17. Id. §§ 1639(a)(1)(B), (b)(1); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.31(c)(1), 226.32(c)(1).
With the important exception of the right to rescind a mortgage refinancing
loan, the remedies for violation of TILA disclosure requirements are
somewhat limited in practice. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640-1641. As this Article
focuses on public enforcement issues, the private right of action for violation
of consumer protection laws is not relevant to our inquiry.
18. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2603, 2604.
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by the consumer in originating the mortgage must be given to
the consumer within three days of the application for the
mortgage loan.19 RESPA and various state law requirements
impose other disclosure obligations on mortgage lenders that
add more weight (literally) to the unmanageable and
unreadable collection of documents that constitute a typical
residential mortgage loan closing.20
2. Restrictions on the Terms of Mortgage Loans
Less prominent in the mortgage lending regulatory scheme
are substantive restrictions on the costs and terms of
residential mortgage loans.21 No federal law substantially
restricts the terms of most residential mortgage lending. The
primary exception to this light regulatory touch on mortgage
loan terms are certain requirements that apply to the limited
set of mortgage loans regulated under HOEPA.22 HOEPA is
the only federal law that restricts the substantive terms of
residential mortgage loans in the United States regardless of
the state in which the loan is originated or the licensing status
of the lender.
HOEPA loans cannot contain negative
amortization terms or most prepayment penalties.23
19. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2604(c)- G  5(63$ DOVR SURKLELWV ´NLFNEDFNVµ EHWZHHQ
and among lenders and mortgage settlement service providers, such as
appraisers or title insurers. 12 U.S.C. § 2607. These provisions are
substantially eviscerated, however, by allowing affiliates to escape this
restriction through the provision of a disclosure at closing. 12 U.S.C. §
2607(c). Public enforcement of the limited kickback prohibition remaining
after the exclusion of affiliates is notoriously weak.
See U.S. GOV·T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF THE
TITLE INDUSTRY AND BETTER PROTECT CONSUMERS (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07401.pdf.
20. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2603-2604. The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency called for simplifying and streamlining consumer disclosures in
 VWDWLQJ WKDW ´FRQVXPHUV WRGD\ UHFHLYH GLVFORVXUHV VR YROXPLQRXV DQG VR
technical that many simply do not read them ² or when they do, do not
XQGHUVWDQG WKHPµ Consideration of Regulatory Relief Proposals: Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 20 (2005)
(statement of Julie Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency).
21. See Renuart & Thompson, supra note 8.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639(c)-(i); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639(c), (f); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(d)(2), (d)(6)-(7). Reverse
mortgages, which are typically sold to elderly homeowners, also are subject to
substantive loan-term restrictions, 12 C.F.R. § 226.33, although this type of

7

286

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:279

State laws, on the other hand, often provide important
limits on the costs of mortgage loans. Several states, such as
Iowa, prohibit or restrict the imposition of prepayment
penalties on mortgage loans.24 Various state laws also limit
the amount of finance charges, late fees, or provide loan terms
at a rate higher than that for which the borrower qualifies.25
The type of loan terms regulated and the limits placed on those
loan terms vary widely under state law.
3. Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practice Regulation
Although not specifically related to mortgage lending or
even consumer finance transactions, an important part of the
public regulatory scheme in the development of the subprime
mortgage lending market is statutory fraud laws, often referred
to as unfair and deceptive acts and practices laws, or simply
´8'$3µ ODZV26 UDAP laws have a different character than
either disclosure requirements or substantive loan term
restrictions.
Consumer finance disclosures or loan term
restrictions provide generally objective, if often complex,
compliance standards.
A public regulator can create a
checklist for a compliance program relying almost exclusively
on the documents in the loan file.27 Whether the TILA
disclosure is in the file and properly completed, or whether the
loan contains a permissible prepayment penalty, are questions
that usually will have a clear answer discernible on
examination of the loan documents.
loan is of little consequence to the story at issue here.
24. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 535.9 (2006).
25. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §  D   SURKLELWLQJ ´FKXUQLQJµ RU
putting a borrower into a loan that does not provide a tangible net benefit);
Id. § 58.137 (limiting fees to 5% of loan amount); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-3(3)
(2003) (limiting the circumstances in which a late fee may be charged); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-10.1 (1993) (limiting the amount of late fees).
26. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of
Public Consumer Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on
Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 674 (2008).
27. See, e.g., Rule to Simplify and Improve the Process of Obtaining
Mortgages and Reduce Consumer Settlement Costs, 73 Fed. Reg. 68,204,
68,243 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500, app. A) (line-byline instructions for completing the settlement statements that lenders must
disclose to borrowers pursuant to RESPA).
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On the other hand, determining a violation of UDAP laws
requires a public enforcement agency to ask questions such as:
did the homeowner understand the loan terms; were the
representations about loan terms in the sale of the loan
consistent with the actual loan product; and did the
homeowner actually receive the benefits of the loan as
indicated in the loan documents. Determining a violation of
UDAP laws likely requires (1) an examination of the loan file;
(2) interviews with the homeowners obtaining the loan and the
employees or agents who arranged the loan; (3) a review of any
marketing materials used in connection with the loan; and (4)
any other relevant information beyond the bounds of the loan
file.28 Even loans that the consumer understood may violate
WKH UHTXLUHPHQW DJDLQVW ´XQIDLUµ SUDFWLFHV LQ WKH )HGHUDO 7UDGH
&RPPLVVLRQ ´)7&µ $FW29 and most state UDAP laws.30
B. Financial Institution Regulatory Structure and UDAP
Enforcement
The financial regulatory system in the United States is a
multi-headed beast, spanning federal and state government.
The most striking feature of the financial regulatory system is
its fragmentation. Reports by the United States Government
Accountability Office and the Congressional Oversight Panel,
appointed under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act,31
examine this system in detail,32 but such analysis is beyond the
purpose of this Article. Instead, I will focus here on a few key
points relevant for understanding what did (or, more
importantly, did not) happen in the regulation of the subprime
28. Federal and State Enforcement of Financial Consumer and Investor
Protection Laws: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th
Cong. (2009) (testimony of Lisa Madigan, Illinois Attorney Gen.) [hereinafter
Madigan
2009
testimony],
available
at
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/consumers/Testimony_before_Rep_Fra
nk.pdf, at 2-6.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (2006).
30. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (2009).
31. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5233(a) (West 2009 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part).
32. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 5; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL,
SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM (2009), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regulatoryreform.pdf
[hereinafter COP REPORT].
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mortgage market.
Especially as to mortgage financing, the regulatory system
divides into three general categories of regulation³depository
institutions (mostly banks and thrifts), securities, and nonbanks. Within each of these categories, multiple federal and
state regulators operate with different authorities and
purposes. Because this Article focuses on the failure of the
regulatory structure to correct problems in loan origination, I
will describe only the depository and non-bank regulatory
schemes. The third part of this subsection sketches the reach
of state attorneys general and the Federal Trade Commission
in UDAP enforcement.
1. Depository Institution Regulation
Depository institution regulation occurs at both the state
and federal levels.33 There are three types of depository
institutions³banks, thrifts, and credit unions.34 Each of these
types of institutions has its own regulator at the federal or
state level.35 National banks are regulated by the Office of the
&RPSWUROOHU RI WKH &XUUHQF\ ´2&&µ 36 Thrifts, or savings
banks, arose from the ashes of the collapsed savings and loan
regulatory system in the 1980s and are regulated at the federal
level by the Office RI 7KULIW 6XSHUYLVLRQ ´276µ 37 Federal
credit unions are regulated by the National Credit Union
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ ´1&8$µ 38 States also typically have an
analogous depository institution regulatory structure for each
of these forms, usually conducted through a regulator called
WKH 'HSDUWPHQW RI )LQDQFLDO ,QVWLWXWLRQV ´'),µ 39
The
33. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 79-80.
34. See, e.g., id.
35. See, e.g., id.
36. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, About the OCC,
http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited May 29, 2009).
37. Office
of
Thrift
Supervision,
History,
http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=History (last visited May 29, 2009).
38. National
Credit
Union
Administration,
About
NCUA,
http://www.ncua.gov/About/Default.aspx (last visited May 29, 2009).
39. See, e.g., California Department of Financial Institutions,
http://www.dfi.ca.gov/ (last visited May 31, 2009); Tennessee Department of
Financial Institutions, http://www.state.tn.us/tdfi (last visited Sept. 22,
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primary function of each of these regulators is to ensure that
the depository institutions are run in a safe and sound manner
so that depositors, and ultimately the federal deposit insurance
system, are protected from irresponsible business practices.40
A depository institution draws its operating authority from
a charter authorized by the specific federal or state law under
which each regulator operates, and the institution pays
assessments to that regulator.41 There are two unique aspects
to this regulatory system.
First, financial institutions
essentially select their regulator by selecting their type of
charter.42 Second, the budget for the regulator is drawn
primarily from charter fees paid by the regulated entities.43
The largest bank regulator, the OCC, typically derives more
than 90% of its fee income from charter fees paid by the
entities that it regulates.44 Regulatory agencies in some other
fields assess fees, but the depository institution regulatory
system is unique in that it allows the regulated entity to select
its own regulator while simultaneously asking the regulator to
rely on assessments levied on those same regulated entities as
its primary source of operating funds.45 The predictable result
RI WKLV DUUDQJHPHQW LV WKDW UHJXODWRUV HQJDJH LQ ´FKDUWHU
Financial
FRPSHWLWLRQµ IRU GHSRVLWRU\ LQVWLWXWLRQV46
institutions can and do switch from one type of charter to
another, and thus from one regulator to another, when the
institution determines that such a switch in charter is in its
own self-interest.47
7KH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH %RDUG ´)5%µ KDV D UROH ZLWK
2009); Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions, http://www.wdfi.org/
(last visited May 31, 2009).
40. See Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending:
Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 73 (2005).
41. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 79-80.
42. See, e.g., id.
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 59.
44. Amanda Quester & Kathleen Keest, Looking Ahead After Watters v.
Wachovia Bank: Challenges for Lower Courts, Congress, and the Comptroller
of the Currency, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 187, 200 (2007).
45. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 159 (2006) (Federal Communications
Commission fees).
46. DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION
AND THE UNDERMINING OF AMERICA·S MORTGAGE MARKET 177-78 (2009).
47. Id.
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depository institutions, regardless of the primary regulator.48
The FRB plays a critical role in mortgage lending regulation
through its authority under TILA and HOEPA to enact
regulations that apply nationwide to all mortgage loans³rules
that must be complied with by depository institutions and nonbank institutions alike.49 No other regulatory entity possesses
this type of critical rule-making authority.
7KH )5%·V
authority under HOEPA is particularly important with
subprime mortgage lending because it allows the promulgation
of substantive rules directed at high-cost lending.50 The FRB
even has the ability to promulgaWH UXOHV FKDQJLQJ WKH ´WULJJHUµ
amounts that define which loans are deemed sufficiently highFRVW WR EH HOLJLEOH IRU LQFOXVLRQ XQGHU +2(3$·V SURWHFWLRQV51

48. Mortgage Lending Reform: A Comprehensive Review of the American
Mortgage System: Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit of the H. Financial Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009)
(written statement of Sandra F. Braunstein, Director, Division of Consumer
and Community Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
[hereinafter
Braunstein
Testimony],
available
at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/braunstein031109.
SGI DW  ´7KH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH KDV SULPDU\ UXOHZULWLQJ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU
many consumer protection laws, including the Truth in Lending Act and the
+RPH 2ZQHUVKLS DQG (TXLW\ 3URWHFWLRQ $FW     >7@KH %RDUG·V QHZ UXOHV
apply to all mortgage lenders, not just depository institutions supervised by
WKH IHGHUDO EDQNLQJ DQG WKULIW DJHQFLHVµ 
49. See  86&   D ´7KH %RDUG VKDOO SUHVFULEH UHJXODWLRQV WR
FDUU\ RXW WKH SXUSRVHV RI WKLV VXEFKDSWHUµ  id. § 1639(l  ´7KH %RDUG E\
regulation or order, shall prohibit acts or practices in connection with (A)
mortgage loans that the Board finds to be unfair, deceptive, or designed to
evade the provisions of this section; and (B) refinancing of mortgage loans
that the Board finds to be associated with abusive lending practices, or that
are otherwise not in the interest of the borrower.µ .
50. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,529 (July 30, 2008) (to be
FRGLILHG DW  &)5 SW  ´&RQJUHVV VHW PLQLPXP VWDQGDUGV IRU +2(3$
loans. The Board is authorized to strengthen those standards for HOEPA
loans when the Board finds practices unfaLU GHFHSWLYH RU DEXVLYHµ 
Braunstein Testimony, supra note 48, at 152-54. In fact, the Federal Reserve
Board finally implemented a program of supervision for nonbank subsidiaries
of bank holding companies in September 2009. Div. of Consumer & Cmty.
Affairs, Fed. Reserve Sys., Consumer Compliance Supervision Policy for
Nonbank Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking
Organizations, Consumer Affairs Letter 09-8 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/caletters/2009/0908/caltr0908.htm.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(2) (2006).
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2. Regulation of Non-Bank Lenders
A striking feature of the growth in subprime mortgage
origination was the rise of lending channels outside the
depository institution, often called non-bank lenders.52 There
is very limited federal oversight of most of these non-bank
mortgage lenders.
They must comply with the general
disclosure requirements in TILA and RESPA, as well as other
limited federal law governing all mortgage-lending activity, but
there is no federal regulator supervising these entities.53
Instead, non-bank lenders are regulated by state DFIs.54 As
noted in the U.S. government reports on financial institution
regulation, non-bank lenders were not supervised for safety
and soundness.55
An important exception to state supervision of non-bank
lenders is when these entities are operating subsidiaries of a
national bank. The OCC has taken the position that non-bank
operating subsidiaries of national banks are subject only to
regulation by the OCC and that regulation of such entities by
state DFIs was preempted by the National Bank Act.56 In
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., a divided United States
6XSUHPH &RXUW XSKHOG WKH 2&&·V H[SDQVLYH YLHZ RI LWV

52. See generally Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory
Lending, 122 BANKING L.J. 483, 536-41 (2005) (discussing the rise of non-bank
mortgage lenders making high-cost subprime loans).
53. See generally Braunstein Testimony, supra note 48.
54. Peterson, supra note 40, at 84-86. Because these lenders were not
depository institutions, they were not subject to safety and soundness
examinations. A critical recommendation of the recent reports on the
financial institution regulatory system has been that the public sector should
ensure that any entity making mortgage loans is examined for safety
soundness. As we have discovered in the last few years, failure of these loans
ultimately resulted in consequence to the public.
55. U.S. DEP·T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP·T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV.,
HUD ² TREASURY REPORT, at 18 (2000). See also Engel & McCoy, A Tale of
Three Markets, supra note 6, at 1291-92.
56. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 40, at 76- GLVFXVVLQJ WKH 2&&·V
actions, including regulations, litigation, and asserting preemption of state
laws regulating the mortgage of lending activities non-bank subsidiaries of
QDWLRQDO EDQNV DQG QRWLQJ WKDW ´>H@ven the federal government itself found in
a GAO audit that non-bank mortgage lending subsidiaries owned by bank
KROGLQJ FRPSDQLHV KDYH UHFHLYHG OLJKW VFUXWLQ\ E\ IHGHUDO UHJXODWRUVµ 
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preemptive authority in this respect.57
3. UDAP Enforcement
Federal UDAP law is enforced primarily by the FTC. 58
Additionally, UDAP laws, sometimes modeled on the FTC Act
itself, exist in every state.59 State attorneys general typically
have the authority to enforce state UDAP laws as well.60 Both
the FTC and state attorneys general have extraordinarily
broad scope in the type of conduct under their purview.61
Telemarketing, automobile sales, credit repair organizations,
and countless other marketplace transactions are regularly
subject to UDAP actions by the FTC or the state attorneys
general.62 Mortgage lending is just one of the many areas in
57. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
58. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 95-97 (discussing the mission
and enforcement authority of the FTC).
59. Budnitz, supra note 26, at 674.
60. Id. at 676-77.
61. 7KH )7& LV ´HPSRZHUHG DQG GLUHFWHG WR SUHYHQW    XQIDir methods
of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
SUDFWLFHV LQ RU DIIHFWLQJ FRPPHUFHµ  86&   D    6WDWH PLQLFTC statutes similarly prohibit unfair and deceptive acts or practices.
Budnitz, supra note 26, at 674.
62. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Commission Actions for April
2009, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/04/index.shtm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009)
(listing FTC enforcement actions involving anticompetitive or unfair and
deceptive practices in the areas of telephone service, breakfast cereal, cable
and satellite television, herbal remedies, and others); Press Release, Iowa
'HSDUWPHQW RI -XVWLFH 2IILFH RI WKH $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO ´*HW-Rich-4XLFNµ
Scheme
Banned
from
Iowa
(May
8,
2009),
available
at
http://www.iowa.gov/government/ag/latest_news/releases/may_2009/World_W
ealth.html (discussing an action against a company using misleading
DGYHUWLVHPHQWV WR PDUNHW ´PRQH\-PDNLQJ RSSRUWXQLWLHVµ  3UHVV 5HOHDVH
State of New York, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Cuomo
Obtains Court Order Against Poughkeepsie Chevrolet for Fraudulent Sales
Practices
(Mar.
24,
2009),
available
at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/mar/mar24a_09.html
(discussing action against car dealership for fraudulent and deceptive acts in
connection with the sale of automobiles); Press Release, State of Minnesota,
Office of the Attorney General, Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson
Files Suit Against Source Lending Corporation Over Abusive Predatory
Mortgage
Lending
Practices
(Aug.
14,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/080814Mortgage.asp
GLVFXVVLQJ DFWLRQ DJDLQVW D PRUWJDJH EURNHU IRU XVLQJ ´EDLW-and-VZLWFKµ
tactics).
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which these agencies operate.
Both the FTC and state attorneys general have restrictions
on their enforcement authority.
The Federal Trade
Commission is restricted from taking actions against banks. 63
The OCC claims UDAP authority over the conduct of national
banks.64 State UDAP laws contain a variety of restrictions on
public enforcement, but these limits vary widely among the
states. A few states do not allow their attorneys general to
bring actions against lenders.65 Some other states prevent
attorney general actions if the target of the action is an entity
regulated by another state or federal agency.66
II. How the Various Regulators Performed
The question at issue here is how these various public
regulators employed their resources and authority to identify
and regulate the abuses in subprime lending before the
mortgage crisis became apparent. The answer, in short, is that
the only public agencies that systematically attempted to
attack problems in subprime mortgage lending were a few state
attorneys general allied with a few state financial regulators
who brought actions alleging UDAP violations.
A. State Consumer Protection Actions Identified Lending
Weaknesses
Beginning in the late 1990s, a small group of state
attorneys general, joined by a few state financial regulators,
began to identify consumer protection problems with subprime
mortgage lending and brought collective actions, known as
multi-state enforcement actions, against these lenders.67
63. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006).
64. Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Brokered and
Purchased Loans, OCC Advisory Letter 2003-3, at 5, available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-3.pdf.
65. Peterson, supra note 40, at 50.
66. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.170 (2009).
67. Prior to joining the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law
School in 2005, the author was an Assistant Attorney General in the
0LQQHVRWD $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO·V 2IILFH DQG ZDV SHUVRQDOO\ LQYROYHG LQ the
leadership of all of the enforcement actions described herein.
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Several state attorneys general and regulators initiated actions
DJDLQVW )LUVW $OOLDQFH 0RUWJDJH &RPSDQ\
´)$0&2µ
beginning in 1998.68
FAMCO was making extraordinarily high cost loans to
borrowers, with fees regularly exceeding 20% of the principal
amount in a large number of cases.69 The vast majority of
ERUURZHUV ZHUH VROG ´WHDVHU UDWHµ DGMXVWDEOH UDWH PRUWJDJHV
that would increase at an average of more than 2%, even if
rates remained stable.70 Most borrowers had no idea about
these high costs and adjustable interest rates.71
The deceptive practices engaged in by FAMCO were
orchestrated through an intensive and highly structured sales
DSSURDFK FHQWHUHG RQ D VDOHV VFULSW WKH FRPSDQ\ FDOOHG ´7KH
7UDFNµ72 The Track sales presentation involved building trust
between the loan officer and the homeowner and then
confusing the homeowner about the extraordinary loan terms.73
Loan officers, who were typically former automobile
VDOHVSHRSOH ZHUH VHQW WR )$0&2·V &DOLIRUQLD KHDGTXDUWHUV WR
train for a month in delivering the sales talk.74 FAMCO filed
68. Promoting Homeownership by Ensuring Liquidity in the Subprime
Mortgage Market: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on Housing and
Community Opportunity, 108th Cong. (2004) (written testimony of Pamela
Kogut, Massachusetts Assistant Attorney Gen.) [hereinafter Kogut
Testimony],
available
at
http://www.house.gov/financialservices/media/pdf/062304pk.pdf
(describing
the actions taken by state attorneys general against FAMCO).
69. Id. at 3 (stating that in Massachusetts, 35% of loan fees exceeded
20% and 73% exceeded 10%). See also 0HPRUDQGXP LQ 6XSSRUW RI WKH 6WDWH·V
Motion for a Temporary Injunction at 4, State v. First Alliance Mortgage Co.,
No. C9-98-11416 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 20, 1998) (supporting a temporary
injunction, stating that the average loan fee in Ramsey County was almost
22%).
70. Kogut Testimony, supra note 68, at 4 (majority of FAMCO loans
were teaser rate ARMs); Memorandum in Support of the State·s Motion for a
Temporary Injunction, supra note 69, at 5 (stating that all of the Ramsey
County borrowers had ARM loans with teaser rates of more than 3% on
average).
71. 0HPRUDQGXP LQ 6XSSRUW RI WKH 6WDWH·V 0RWLRQ IRU D 7HPSRUDU\
Injunction, supra note 69, at 5.
72. Kogut Testimony, supra note 68, at 4-5.
73. Id. See also 0HPRUDQGXP LQ 6XSSRUW RI WKH 6WDWH·V 0RWLRQ IRU D
Temporary Injunction, supra note 69, at 5-10.
74. 0HPRUDQGXP LQ 6XSSRUW RI WKH 6WDWH·V 0RWLRQ IRU D 7HPSRUDU\
Injunction, supra note 69, at 3.
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for bankruptcy in 2000 in the wake of a joint New York Times
and ABC-TV story exposing its lending practices and the state
lawsuits.75
The FAMCO litigation was followed by two other multistate actions, initiated by state consumer protection regulators,
alleging UDAP violations by the largest subprime lenders at
the time. In 2002, the states reached a settlement with
+RXVHKROG ,QF ´+RXVHKROGµ  WKHQ WKH ODUJHVW VXESULPH
mortgage lender in the United States.76 The settlement
included $525 million in restitution to homeowners and
varying payments to the states.77 Perhaps more importantly,
the settlement provided for extensive injunctive relief that
could serve as a roadmap for the problems that lay ahead in
the surging subprime mortgage market.78 The injunction
OLPLWHG +RXVHKROG·V ORDQ IHHV UHTXLUHG WKDW ORDQV FUHDWH D ´QHW
tangible benefLWµ IRU ERUURZHUV DQG LPSRVHG RWKHU UHJXODWLRQV
RQ +RXVHKROG·V PRUWJDJH RULJLQDWLRQ SUDFWLFHV79
In 2004, a similar group of states began investigating
$PHULTXHVW 0RUWJDJH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´$PHULTXHVWµ  D FRPSDQ\
WKDW KDG EHFRPH WKH QDWLRQ·V ODUJHVW VXESULPH Portgage lender
and would become synonymous with unfair and imprudent
subprime mortgage lending.80 The states eventually settled the
case in 2006 for $325 million in restitution to consumers.81
$JDLQ WKH VWDWHV· VHWWOHPHQW LPSRVHG DQ H[WHQVLYH LQMXQFWLRQ
oQ WKH FRPSDQ\·V RSHUDWLRQV DQG ORDQ YROXPH DW $PHULTXHVW
promptly fell.82
75. Diana B. Henriques & Lowell Bergman, Mortgaged Lives: Profiting
From Fine Print With Wall Street's Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at A1;
Diana B. Henriques, Troubled Lender Seeks Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2000, at A1.
76. See, e.g. 6WDWH Y +RXVHKROG ,QW·O ,QF 1R &-02-12133 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Dec. 16, 2002) (example of settlement agreement filed in all 50 states).
77. Id. at 7-11.
78. Id. at 11-22.
79. Id. at 19.
80. See, e.g., Kristin Downey, Mortgage Lender Settles Lawsuit, WASH.
POST, Jan. 24, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/23/AR2006012301523.html.
81. Id. See also State v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. C0-06-2618, at
*9-13 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 21, 2006) (example of settlement agreement filed
in all 50 states) (on file with Pace Law Review).
82. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., at *13-37 (No. C0-06-2618).
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These state consumer protection actions were coincident
with the explosion and the development of the subprime
mortgage industry. At the time the states initiated their
actions against FAMCO in 1998, subprime mortgage lending
had increased dramatically, both in terms of the volume of
loans and the percentage of new market originations.83
Subprime mortgage volume stabilized at about $200 billion
from 1998 through 2002.84
The Ameriquest investigation and settlement occurred at
precisely the moment the subprime mortgage market had
begun its final surge that would ultimately overwhelm global
financial markets.
Subprime mortgage lending jumped,
starting in 2003, and then exploded in the period between 2004
and 2006.85 The volume of subprime mortgage loans peaked at
about $650 billion in 2006, an astounding rise from the volume
level of about $200 billion in 2002.86 The conduct alleged to
violate state laws in the Ameriquest case should sound familiar
to anyone who has tracked the mortgage meltdown³falsified
stated income loans, inflated appraisals, inadequately
understood teaser rates on adjustable mortgages, and other
conduct typical of this latter period of explosive growth in the
subprime market.87 In other words, as the subprime market
exploded and the deceptive and imprudent lending practices
evolved between 1998 and 2006, the state UDAP actions were
an excellent bellwether and predictor of the problems with this
lending.
83. ELLEN SCHLOMEMER, WEI LI, KEITH ERNST & KATHLEEN KEEST,
LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET & THEIR COST TO
HOMEOWNERS
7
(2006),
available
at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/researchanalysis/foreclosure-paper-report-2-17.pdf.
84. Id.
85. FED. RESERVE BD. OF SAN FRANCISCO, THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
MARKET: NATIONAL AND TWELFTH DISTRICT DEVELOPMENTS 8 (2007), available
at
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/federalreserve/annual/2007/2007annualrepo
rt.pdf.
86. Id.
87. See Madigan 2009 testimony, supra note 30, at 3-4. See also State v.
Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. C0-06-2618 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 21, 2006);
3UHVV 5HOHDVH 6WDWH RI :DVKLQJWRQ $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO·V 2IILFH Washington
Homeowners to Receive Millions in Ameriquest Settlement, (Jan. 23, 2006),
available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/pressrelease.aspx?&id=16354.
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B. Failure of the Financial Institution Regulatory System to
Comprehend the Threat of Subprime Mortgage Lending
The actions of safety and soundness regulators during this
period showed a different pattern. There is no shortage of
blame to be laid on financial institution regulators for their
failure to detect and remedy the sales and lending practices
that led to the explosion of home foreclosures and the eventual
implosion in residential mortgage lending. State financial
institution regulators, with fewer resources and substantially
less regulatory power than federal regulators, were the
primary regulators of non-bank mortgage originators who were
not subsidiaries of federally chartered institutions.88 Although
these regulators joined with the state attorneys general in the
multi-state actions against major subprime lenders, they were
unable to control the lending practices of these entities
sufficiently to prevent the problems that occurred in the
origination of residential mortgages.89
Some of the most spectacular failures in the subprime
mortgage market were federally regulated institutions. The
OTS, in particular, has been sharply criticized for its lax
regulation of mortgage lending.90 ,Q  WKH QDWLRQ·V ODUJHVW
mortgage
lender,
Countrywide
Financial
Corp.
´&RXQWU\ZLGHµ  VZLWFKHG LWV FKDUWHU IURP WKH 2&& WR WKH 276
amid circumstances suggesting the worst sort of shopping for a
weak regulator.91 Before its collapse, IndyMac was supervised
by the OTS and originated extraordinary volumes of problem
loans with little obstruction from the OTS.92 Likewise, OCC
regulated financial institutions engaged in loan origination or
invested in loans originated by mortgage brokers that led to
massive losses, such as First National Bank of Nevada and its
88. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 15.
89. See Press Release, 6WDWH RI :DVKLQJWRQ $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO·V 2IILFH,
supra note 87.
90. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking
Regulator Played Advocate Over Enforcer, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2008;
Editorial, Our View on the Credit Crisis: A System That Invited Bankers to
Make Bad Loans, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 2009.
91. Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 90.
92. Id.
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predecessor banks.93
As to substantive mortgage regulations, the federal
regulators have substantial formal authority and the authority
WR LVVXH ´JXLGDQFHµ WR WKHLU LQVWLWXWLRQV EXW XQWLO WKH YHU\ HQG
of the surge of subprime lending, these regulators did little to
limit bank investment in, or origination of, problem loans.94 In
1999, and again in 2006, the federal banking agencies issued
JXLGDQFH RQ VXESULPH DQG WKHQ ´QRQWUDGLWLRQDOµ PRUWJDJH
products, but they brushed aside consumer advocate warnings
about these products and refused to adopt substantial limits on
such lending, either by formal or informal action.95
In fact, a primary contribution of both the OCC and the
OTS to substantive regulation of mortgage terms was the
issuance of sweeping regulations preempting state laws that
limited unfair mortgage loan terms for homeowners.96 For
example, after Georgia passed its own anti-predatory lending
law with restrictions that applied even to secondary market
assignees of mortgage laws, both the OTS and the OCC acted
swiftly to preempt the Georgia law.97
The OCC also actively worked to suppress consumer
protection investigation of, and enforcement actions against,
their regulated entities by state attorneys general,
promulgating rules claiming for itself the exclusive authority to
investigate and enforce violations of state consumer protection
laws, thus purporting to effectively bar state enforcement
agencies from enforcing their own state laws against a national
bank even when those laws were not preempted.98 The United
State Supreme Court recently found that this rule was so
´EL]DUUHµ DQG FRQWUDU\ WR WKH WH[W DQG KLVWRU\ RI WKH 1DWLRQDO
Bank Act that it overturned the regulation, even while giving

93. David Enrich & Damian Paletta, Two Bank Failures Hint At
Oversight Woes, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Oct. 5, 2008.
94. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 46, at 178-81.
95. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Risk, 71 Fed.
Reg. 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006); Interagency Guidance on Subprime Lending (Mar.
1, 1999), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/1999/FIL9920a.html. See
also IMMERGLUCK, supra note 46, at 181-82.
96. COP REPORT, supra note 32, at 52.
97. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 46, at 178.
98. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2009).
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deference under the Chevron Doctrine.99
The OCC also
regularly engaged in filing amicus briefs and intervening in
cases on behalf of its regulated entities and against state
UDAP enforcement or consumers seeking redress from a
national bank.100 John Hawke, the former Comptroller of the
&XUUHQF\ SXEOLFO\ GHIHQGHG WKH 2&&·V SUHHPSWLRQ RI VWDWH ODZ
and state regulators to persuade financial institutions to switch
from a state charter to a national bank charter, stating that he
ZDV ´QRW WKH OHDVW ELW DVKDPHG WR SURPRWHµ preemption as ´one
RI WKH DGYDQWDJHV RI D QDWLRQDO FKDUWHUµ101
While obstructing state UDAP enforcement with broad
assertions of preemptive authority, the OCC and the OTS
failed to initiate UDAP enforcement activity in the area of
mortgage lending. The OCC pursued almost no major UDAP
actions involving mortgage lending during the period of
abusive subprime mortgage lending.102 The OCC has almost no
record of taking public consumer enforcement actions against
large banks.103
The FRB also took little or no action to control subprime
mortgage lending. It alone has the authority, under HOEPA,
to impose nationwide substantive restrictions on all high-cost
residential mortgage loans.104 Again, only after the collapse of
subprime mortgage lending in 2007 did the FRB update
HOEPA rules, and even then, it delayed the effective date of
the rule changes until October 2009, more than a year after the
promulgation of the final amendments.105 The remarks of the
FRB Directors during the subprime mortgage lending explosion
make clear that it believed innovation in the mortgage lending
99. &XRPR Y &OHDULQJKRXVH $VV·Q  6 &W    
100. Quester & Keest, supra note 44, at 199.
101. Jess Bravin & Paul Beckett, Friendly Watchdog: Federal Regulator
Often Helps Banks Fighting Consumers ² 'HSHQGHQW RQ /HQGHUV· )HHV 2&&
Takes Their Side Against Local, State Laws ² Defending Uniform Rules,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A1.
102. Quester & Keest, supra note 46, at 195-96.
103. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed
the Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking
System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 232
(2004).
104. See supra notes 49-51.
105. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226); 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,595.
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market would be impeded by any serious attempt to impose
substantive restrictions on high-cost mortgage lending and that
expanded subprime lending was a social good.106
Federal regulators with a singular mission of supervising
the financial institutions they chartered did little to
comprehend or remedy the mortgage lending problems of the
last decade and impeded the work of state legislatures and
consumer protection enforcers in this area.
The most
prominent actions against subprime mortgage lenders were
taken by state attorneys general with general UDAP authority
over these lenders, but also with UDAP responsibility for a
range of other industries and marketplace conduct. The
following section suggests the reason for this outcome and the
lessons that can be learned.
III. Creating Safer Financial Institutions by Incorporating
Consumer Protection Norms
The oft-UHSHDWHG SKUDVH ´QR RQH FRXOG KDYH SUHGLFWHG WKLV
FULVLVµ LV SDWHQWO\ LQFRUUHFW ,I UHJXODWRUV ZHUH IRFXVHG RQ WKH
reality of the subprime mortgage lending practices that began
to emerge in the late 1990s, then nothing about the collapse of
that boom would have been surprising. The weakness of
subprime mortgage loans, and the devastation visited upon
subprime borrowers and their communities, was predictable
and preventable. It is not a coincidence that state entities with
a central UDAP focus were the only regulators or organizations
that made substantial efforts to identify and address
rampantly imprudent mortgage lending practices during the
time of explosive growth in this type of lending. This result
occurred even though the state attorneys general have far
fewer resources devoted to the area of mortgage lending
practices than federal depository institution regulators and
possess far less authority to stop abusive practices by
administrative order or regulation.
106. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 46, at 181. See generally Binyamin
Appelbaum, As Subprime /HQGLQJ &ULVLV 8QIROGHG :DWFKGRJ )HG 'LGQ·W
Bother Barking, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2009,
available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/26/AR2009092602706.html?sub=AR.
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Therein lies two important lessons for the restructuring of
financial institution regulation. First, the information gained
from enforcing UDAP laws differs from the information gained
by enforcing other types of consumer protection laws, and this
type of knowledge acquired from UDAP enforcement has been
undervalued by regulators. Second, it is critical to align
incentives for UDAP enforcement and create an open and
flexible structure for these enforcement actions against
financial institutions.
A.

Building UDAP Norms in Financial Institution Regulation

Regulator understanding of potential problems is
determined in part by the type of information it receives, which
informs the knowledge of the regulator about the industry and
businesses it supervises.
Financial institution regulators
would benefit by gleaning knowledge from effective UDAP
enforcement.
1. UDAP Enforcement Helps Regulators Gain
Understanding
Federal financial institution regulators have viewed
FRQVXPHU SURWHFWLRQ DV D ´FRPSOLDQFHµ SUREOHP ZKLFK RIWHQ
has been short-hand for making sure that the regulated entity
gave the consumer required disclosures. These regulators
periodically conduct examinations of their regulated
institutions. A search of the OCC website for its instructions to
bank examiners on consumer protection issues yields mostly
detailed manuals for ensuring that the institution complied
with various federal disclosure laws.107
Compliance examinations focus on reviewing data and
transaction testing to determine performance and efficient
market functioning, depending on the regulator.108 Federal
107. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMPTROLLER·S HANDBOOK ² CONSUMER COMPLIANCE (1999), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/compliance.htm.
108. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMPTROLLER·S
HANDBOOK,
at
1-3
(1996),
available
at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/overview.pdf.
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financial institution regulators generally rely on the regulated
entity itself to report fraud to the regulator.109 Consumer
protection compliance work of this sort is not of great
importance to federal financial institution regulators, in any
case, because safety and soundness concerns predominate.110
Public actions for violations of UDAP laws, on the other
hand, typically arise from observations and reflected
experience of individuals who work closely with consumers who
are in distress. In the case of subprime lending, state
attorneys general and other consumer protection regulators
received complaints showing a pattern of mortgage loans whose
terms revealed a disconnection between cost and risk, and in
which homeowners repeatedly expressed misperception of the
actual terms of the mortgage. State attorneys general receive
and evaluate large volumes of complaints by borrowers, and
have expertise in analyzing such data for patterns of
conduct.111 The more aggressive agencies also have close ties to
credit counselors, legal aid organizations, and other public
interest organizations, which reflect the experience of an even
larger number of borrowers.112 In other words, consumer
protection agencies gather and focus on data that is based on
the experience and perceptions of the credit users.
Furthermore, UDAP regulators often have a bias in favor
of believing consumers whose experience is not necessarily
consistent with the written documents purposed by the seller
that memorialize the transaction. In the case of FAMCO, for
example, the state actions did not allege any breach of contract
or non-compliance with required disclosures, but rather focused
109. See, e.g., Federal and State Enforcement of Financial Consumer and
Investor Protection Laws: Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th
Cong. (2009) (written statement of Elizabeth Duke, Member, Federal Reserve
Board
of
Governors),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/frb_-_duke.pdf.
110. Marilyn Cane, Non-Broker Brokers and Other Anomalies in the
Regulation of Financial Services, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 126 (1988)
QRWLQJ LQ WKH VHFXULWLHV IUDXG FRQWH[W WKDW ´Whe examination of banks has its
IRFXV RQ EDQN VROYHQF\ QRW WKH GHWHFWLRQ RU SUHYHQWLRQ RI VHFXULWLHV IUDXGµ 
See also Peterson, supra note 40, at 73.
111. See Brief for Center for Responsible Lending et al. as Amici Curiae
6XSSRUWLQJ 3HWLWLRQHU &XRPR Y &OHDULQJKRXVH $VV·Q  6 &W  
(No. 08-453), 2009 WL 556380.
112. See Madigan 2009 testimony, supra note 28, at 1, 7-8.
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on the highly misleading oral sales presentation that led
borrowers to enter loans that they fundamentally did not
understand.113 FAMCO was an early adopter of funding
subprime lending through mortgage-backed securities.114 In
funding FAMCO ten years ago, Lehman Brothers was aware of
WKH FRQVXPHU SURWHFWLRQ FRQFHUQV ZLWK )$0&2·V VXESULPH
PRUWJDJH OHQGLQJ $ GLVWULFW FRXUW ODWHU IRXQG WKDW ´/HKPDQ
knew that First Alliance was engaged in fraudulent practices
designed to induce consumers to obtain loans from First
AOOLDQFHµ115
Knowledge gained from UDAP enforcement has a direct
bearing on financial institution safety and soundness. In the
case of subprime lending and the mortgage meltdown, loan
performance data in the late 1990s and early 2000s would not
necessarily have suggested a substantial reason for concern,
principally because housing appreciation was covering the sins
apparent when looking at the problems of individual
homeowners. A loan performs well for safety and soundness
purposes if housing appreciation (and loose underwriting)
allows a borrower to refinance from one unsustainable loan to
an even more unsustainable loan, or allows that borrower to
sell his or her home prior to default.116 It is a difficult task to
sort through the influences on loan performance data at the
time the data is current.
UDAP enforcers, however,
understood that these loans were a disaster for borrowers long
before it became apparent that creditors and investors holding
these loans would suffer.117
2. Methods for Incorporating UDAP Norms in Regulation
The key to effective regulation is to bridge the gap between
these two different types of knowledge. Regulators must
measure the reality of what borrowers really understand about
113. See Kogut Testimony, supra note 68, at 3-4.
114. Diana B. Henriques & Lowell Bergman, Profiting From Fine Print
With Wall Street's Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at A1.
115. In re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 298 B.R. 652, 668 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
116. SCHLOMEMER, LI, ERNST & KEEST, supra note 83, at 13-14.
117. See Madigan 2009 testimony, supra note 28, at 2-6.
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a loan and whether borrowers are acting in their long-run self
interest, against the performance of consumer financial
products. If there is a disconnect between what UDAP
enforcement reveals and what review of financial performance
indicates, then a financial institution regulator has strong
reason to dig deeper into the operations of the regulated entity.
The starting point for creating these conditions with
financial institution regulators is to increase the prominence of
UDAP enforcement in the regulatory system. UDAP concerns
are seen by financial institution regulators as either irrelevant
to mortgage market regulation or as antithetical to creating
efficient mortgage markets. Consumer complaints are too often
considered either isolated occurrences or technical problems
(e.g., failure to provide the correct disclosure form).118 The
OCC consumer complaint system has been described by one
commentator as actually discouraging the filing of consumer
complaints about national banks.119
Regardless of what new regulatory structures emerge from
the variety of options for reform, a UDAP perspective can be
brought into the core of the regulatory system. The system for
accepting, evaluating, and resolving consumer complaints
should be as open and user-friendly as possible. Consumer
complaints should be seen as an opportunity to gain insight
into the understanding of financial institution products by
consumers.
Financial regulators should also seek out
information from individuals and organizations who work
closely with borrowers and other consumers of financial
institution products. Credit counselors and consumer advocacy
organizations have important knowledge about how consumers
are using and evaluating financial products.
While these actions can be part of almost any restructured
regulator, a precondition to effectively incorporating a UDAP
perspective into the regulatory system is the creation of the
proper incentives for the regulator. The next subsection looks
at that issue.

118. See Quester & Keest, supra note 44, at 235-36.
119. Id. at 236.
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Incentives

Changes

to

Create

UDAP

305

Enforcement

An obvious starting point for any structural change is the
elimination of charter competition so that financial institution
regulators will not have disincentives to bring UDAP actions
DJDLQVW UHJXODWHG HQWLWLHV IUHH WR VZLWFK WR PRUH ´IULHQGO\µ
regulators. A second critical reform is to end preemption of
state UDAP actions against regulated financial institutions
and expand the FTC authority over banks.
1. Align Incentives For UDAP Enforcement
Depository Institution Regulation

Within

The current regulatory structure is riddled with conflicts of
interest that make it almost inevitable that consumer
protection concerns will be seen as antithetical to the core
mission of the depository institution regulators. The banking
UHJXODWRUV DUH VWUXFWXUHG IRU ´FKDUWHU FRPSHWLWLRQµ120 Banks
are allowed to decide whether to have a federal or state
charter, as well as whether to have a bank or savings bank
(thrift) charter.121 Because the funding of financial institution
regulators is based primarily on charter fees paid by the
regulated entities, the size and prestige of the regulatory
institutions³indeed their survival in some cases³is linked to
the number of regulated entities under their authority.122 The
record of financial institution regulators overall has been to
take the side of the regulated entities against UDAP
120. COP REPORT, supra note 32, at 33.
121. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 46, at 177-78.
122. Id. A related problem is the privatization of regulatory functions.
The obvious example of this is the privatization of Fannie Mae in the 1960s.
The effect of making these entities private has been to put consumer
protection concerns in conflict with investor interests. See, e.g., U.S. GOV·T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS
FOR REVISING THE HOUSING ENTERPRISES· LONG-TERM STRUCTURES 32-34
(2009). A more subtle form of this privatization is allowing entities that
serve a key function in determining the form and amount of mortgage lending
to operate without regulation at all, or with minimal supervision. In some
states, mortgage originators are very lightly regulated. The rating agencies,
key players in the breakdown of risk management in the securitization
process, were essentially unregulated. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 30-32.
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enforcement by other public entities as well as actions by
private consumer law attorneys.123
Charter competition should simply be eliminated by
changing the funding method of these regulators and perhaps
creating a unified regulator for all depository financial
institutions. Recent reports by the U.S. government on the
financial crisis have presented this issue as a possible reform to
be adopted in the restructuring of the financial regulatory
system.124 Effective UDAP enforcement requires taking on the
perspective of the aggrieved consumer. It is difficult to imagine
a regulator taking such UDAP concerns seriously when the
regulator is funded by the regulated.
2. Promote Regulatory Competition For Consumer
Protection
The incentives in the current financial institution
regulatory structure for UDAP enforcement, or inaction or
opposition to UDAP enforcement, should be flipped and
barriers to public enforcement of UDAP laws against banks
should be eliminated. State attorneys general should not be
precluded from bringing UDAP enforcement actions against
regulated financial institutions. Such a system would make for
a more efficient use of limited UDAP enforcement resources as
to financial institutions and lower the cost of UDAP
enforcement by entities other than depository institution
regulators. In the current system, a state attorney general
considering a UDAP action against a bank faces the near
certainty that the bank will invoke the threat of preemption
over state law or exclusive federal agency enforcement
authority, and the financial institution will likely find an ally
to assist in defending the case in its federal depository
institution regulator. The prohibition on the FTC bringing
UDAP actions against banks should also be rescinded.
Together, these actions would create an open UDAP public
enforcement system as to financial institutions, which would
123. See Brief for Center for Responsible Lending et al., supra note 111,
at 22-38.
124. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 59-60; COP REPORT, supra note 32, at
33.
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have several advantages.
An open UDAP public enforcement model would serve
much the same function as marketplace competition. More
UDAP enforcement would increase the incentives for financial
institutions and their regulators to prevent UDAP actions.
Regulators faced with competing UDAP enforcement agencies
would have a much greater incentive to pay attention to
consumer complaints of unfair or misleading conduct. A
different public entity bringing a UDAP action against a
financial institution under the purview of the regulator is not a
situation that any public agency wants to experience.125
Focusing regulator attention on this type of knowledge by
providing the fear of action by a different public entity would
help bring the type of knowledge gained in UDAP enforcement
into the core of the financial institution regulatory function.
An open enforcement model increases the number of public
agencies that can take action and thus increases the likelihood
that some public agency will be interested and available in
pursuing needed UDAP enforcement cases. Public agency
priorities for UDAP enforcement shift over time with the
elected or appointed officials in charge of the agency. During
the explosive growth of subprime mortgage lending, the FTC
had UDAP authority for actions against FAMCO, Household,
and Ameriquest because they were not banks, as well as other
non-bank subprime lenders.126 While the FTC later joined with
the states in taking action against FAMCO in 1999,127 the FTC
brought few UDAP actions against subprime lenders
thereafter. State attorneys general stepped into the void.
Conversely, when the FTC is more active in a certain area,
state attorneys general would have less incentive or need to
pursue UDAP cases in that area. Giving more agencies UDAP
authority over financial institutions would result in more
potential for enforcement action.

125. For a recent example of the problems this poses to public agencies,
one need look no further than the recent humiliation of the Securities and
([FKDQJH &RPPLVVLRQ·V IDLOXUH WR DFW LQ WKH 0DGRII FDVH See, e.g., David
Stout, RHSRUW 'HWDLOV +RZ 0DGRII·V :HE (QVQDUHG 6(&, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
2, 2009.
126. See supra notes 63 & 88.
127. Kogut Testimony, supra note 68, at 5.
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The OCC, consistent with the position of regulated
financial institutions, objects to multiple public agencies with
enforcement authority because of the possibility of inconsistent
regulatory requirements.128 Open UDAP public enforcement
would not threaten inconsistency in disclosure requirements,
substantive mortgage term requirements or other rule-based
regulations. The risk of inconsistency comes in differing views
of the various public enforcement entities in enforcing the
broad standards prohibiting unfair and deceptive conduct.
This is exactly the type of variation that allowed state
attorneys general to bring actions against abusive subprime
mortgage lending while other public regulators saw
´FRPSOLDQFHµ LQ WKHVH ORDQV 8'$3 FDVHV DUH QRW HDV\ WR
initiate or prosecute, and having various standards forces other
regulators and the regulated entities alike to pay attention to
the critical knowledge gained by concern with UDAP violations.
Finally, open UDAP public enforcement against financial
institutions would help address a more subtle form of conflict of
interest that exists in the inconsistency between safety and
soundness regulation and UDAP enforcement. A financial
institution subject to possible or extant lawsuits for violation of
UDAP or other consumer protection laws can be financially
weakened by such actions. Especially in a substantial UDAP
case, this places the depository institution regulator in the
SRVLWLRQ RI QHFHVVDULO\ GHIHQGLQJ WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ·V SUDFWLFHV DW
LVVXH LQ RUGHU WR PD[LPL]H WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ·V Voundness, at least
in the short run.
One alternative for preventing this result is to separate
safety and soundness regulation from UDAP enforcement, but
that structure defeats the advantage of combining these
different sources of knowledge in the same regulator. An
option for avoiding this result is an open UDAP public
enforcement model. If state attorney generals, state financial
regulators, or the FTC could readily bring UDAP actions
against depository institutions or their operating subsidiaries,
consumer protection interests would be vindicated. At the
same time, it would ensure that the depository institution
128. Brief of All Former Comptrollers of the Currency Since 1973 as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 29-35, Cuomo v. Clearing House
$VV·Q  6 &W   1R -453), 2009 WL 906571.
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regulators would have a more substantial incentive to discover
and prevent UDAP violations, in part to protect the safety and
soundness of the institution.
IV.

Conclusion

A myriad of issues arise in considering the restructuring of
financial institution regulation. Enforcement of UDAP laws
during the subprime mortgage explosion provided state
attorneys general a richer, earlier understanding of what was
actually happening in the mortgage market. Whether because
of conflicts of interest or regulatory approach, federal
depository institution regulators were not in a position to
effectively utilize this knowledge in regulating residential
mortgage lending. Regulatory reform should ensure that
UDAP enforcement as to financial institutions is effective and
that the knowledge generated from UDAP actions informs the
decision-making of financial institution regulators. Opening
UDAP enforcement against financial institutions to public
agencies with a history of, and disposition toward, UDAP
enforcement would help to achieve this goal.
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